Tokenised securities could settle outside the timetable of MEPS+ only if the cash moved on the same ledger
01 · Executive Summary
The ProblemThe InstrumentsThe Two MarketsThree PerspectivesSequencing
Before Singapore can settle tokenised securities safely, it must choose which tokenised cash instrument to settle them in
We consider capital markets alone: how securities and derivatives traded on Singapore Exchange (SGX) would settle in tokenised cash. We leave payments aside, together with the question of how a tokenised payments system would connect to a tokenised capital market.
CDP already settles cleared trades delivery versus payment, in batches that follow the timetable of MEPS+.1 A tokenised security settling against cash off the ledger would still follow that timetable and its operating hours. The time CDP stays exposed to its clearing members, and so the margin it holds against them, could then shrink only as far as MEPS+ allowed.
Three Singapore dollar (SGD) instruments could provide that cash, and the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) already has programmes for the first two:
Wholesale central bank digital currency (wholesale CBDC)2, which MAS first issued in a live trial in November 2025
Tokenised deposits issued by DBS, OCBC and UOB, which fall within MAS's BLOOM initiative for tokenised deposits and regulated stablecoins
A token that The Central Depository (CDP) would issue to clearing members, backed one-for-one by short-dated government paper (the CDP token). The CDP token does not yet exist, and it is the core of our proposal
Each clearing member could use the CDP token in two markets: to settle securities at CDP and to meet cash margin at SGX Derivatives Clearing (SGX-DC). CDP would hold short-dated government paper, including tokenised Singapore Government Securities (SGS), in the reserve behind the token and keep the yield.
Each instrument answers three questions differently:
Whose liability the money is
What stands behind it
Who keeps the yield on what stands behind it
We offer this as a thought exercise. We set out each instrument and what it would mean in practice, and close with the first steps open to SGX and MAS.
02 · Settlement Money Today
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Singapore's markets already settle in two tiers of money, and a tokenised market should keep both tiers
Securities at CDP
CDP nets each clearing member's obligations and settles them in two batches on settlement day: an intraday batch from 10:00 and a final batch from 13:30, which completes by 16:00. Equities settle two business days after the trade date (T+2).3
Each clearing member pays and receives cash through its settlement bank, and the settlement banks settle with one another in central bank money on the MAS Electronic Payment System (MEPS+).
Government bonds settle separately, at T+1, in MAS's own securities system, MEPS+-SGS.4
Derivatives at SGX-DC
SGX-DC collects margin from clearing members in cash and government securities.
Once a clearing member's margin exceeds USD 1 million, cash and government securities must make up the greater of USD 1 million and 60 per cent of the total.5
Although SGX-DC accepts SGS, clearing members post mainly US Treasuries and Japanese government bonds as non-cash margin, because most of the exposures it clears are in USD and JPY.
How cash settles today
1CDP nets each clearing member's securities obligations and settles them in two batches a day.
2SGX-DC collects margin from clearing members in cash and government securities.
3Each clearing member pays and receives cash through its settlement bank, in commercial bank money.
4Settlement banks settle with one another in central bank money on MEPS+.
5Government bonds settle T+1 in MEPS+-SGS, outside CDP.
Clearing members hold commercial bank money at their settlement banks, which in turn settle with one another in central bank money. Developed markets generally allocate credit risk through these two tiers, and a tokenised market should keep both. The open question is which instrument would fill each tier.
03 · The Cash Leg
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If the cash stays off the ledger, tokenised securities would still settle on the timetable of MEPS+, which limits how far margin could fall
For cleared trades, CDP already removes principal risk. It novates each matched trade, releases securities only once they are paid for, and moves money and securities together in each batch.1
CDP still carries two risks until settlement: a clearing member defaulting during the T+2 window, and a clearing member failing to meet a cash call in the batch. Clearing members post margin on their unsettled trades, and they and CDP contribute to a Clearing Fund that covers losses beyond a defaulter's margin.
If a tokenised security settled against cash off the ledger, CDP would hold it until the cash arrived through MEPS+. Settlement would still follow the timetable and operating hours of MEPS+, so the window, and the margin held against unsettled trades, would stay as they are.
With prefunded cash on the same ledger, CDP could settle each trade once both legs were in place, at any hour. If SGX also shortened the settlement cycle, fewer trades would sit unsettled and the margin they require could fall. Settlement would no longer depend on cash calls being met, because the cash would already be on the ledger.
How long CDP stays exposed
1CDP novates each trade once it is matched, and becomes the counterparty to both sides.
2Until settlement, CDP is exposed to each clearing member's default, and margin on unsettled trades covers it.
3On T+2, CDP moves cash and securities together in a batch that follows the timetable of MEPS+.
4With prefunded cash on the ledger and a shorter settlement cycle, CDP could settle each trade once both legs were in place, and less margin would be needed.
Section 02
Three tokenised cash instruments could settle trades on the ledger, and tokenised SGS held in reserve could earn a yield for CDP
04 · Comparing the Instruments
The ProblemThe InstrumentsThe Two MarketsThree PerspectivesSequencing
The three instruments differ on who owes the money, and only with tokenised deposits would that be a commercial bank
Wholesale CBDC
Tokenised deposits
CDP token proposed
Liability of
MAS
Issuing bank (DBS, OCBC or UOB)
CDP, as issuer
What stands behind it
The sovereign
Bank balance sheet
Segregated reserve of short-dated government paper, backing every token at par
Who keeps the yield
MAS pays no interest, and the money carries no credit risk
Bank keeps its interest margin, as with deposits today
CDP would keep the reserve yield
Access
Set by MAS, with banks first
Bank clients, as today
Prefunded clearing members only
Status
Live trial since November 2025, with a tokenised MAS Bills trial planned
Live within single banks, such as DBS since October 20246, with BLOOM frameworks in development
Proposed here
Two of the three instruments already operate, one in a live trial and the other in live services within single banks. The third, the CDP token, is our proposal.
Tokenised SGS would be one of the reserve assets behind the CDP token, held by CDP.
Wholesale CBDC and the CDP token would leave every clearing member with a claim on MAS or on CDP, so neither instrument would favour one bank over another. A clearing member that settled in a bank's tokenised deposit, by contrast, would hold a claim on that bank.
05 · Wholesale CBDC
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Wholesale CBDC is the safest instrument, and MAS alone decides when capital markets can use it
Wholesale CBDC is a direct liability of MAS, so it carries no credit risk and a payment in it is final. Every other settlement instrument is measured against it.
MAS has already issued wholesale CBDC live. On 13 November 2025 it announced that DBS, OCBC and UOB had settled interbank overnight loans in wholesale CBDC on the Singapore Dollar Test Network. The banks recorded the transactions in their official books and regulatory filings.2
MAS next plans to issue tokenised MAS Bills to primary dealers and settle them in wholesale CBDC. The tokenised MAS Bills trial would put cash and a government security on the same ledger, which is the pairing on which capital markets settlement depends. MAS said it would publish details during 2026, and none had appeared by 9 October 2026.
MAS alone decides who may hold wholesale CBDC and when it moves into production, so capital markets can settle in it only as fast as MAS extends access. SGX can prepare for wider access to wholesale CBDC, but it cannot hasten MAS's decision to grant it.
06 · Tokenised Deposits
The ProblemThe InstrumentsThe Two MarketsThree PerspectivesSequencing
Banks could issue tokenised deposits soonest, but each bank would then have to accept its competitors' tokens at par
A tokenised deposit is commercial bank money recorded on a ledger. It remains the issuing bank's liability to its client, and the bank continues to earn its interest margin.
Banks can issue tokenised deposits under the permissions they already hold, and need no new class of instrument to do so. Of the three instruments, tokenised deposits are therefore the one banks could bring to market soonest.
Each bank would have to accept its competitors' tokens. A clearing member that paid in a DBS token, for example, would be asking OCBC and UOB to hold a claim on DBS.
Three tokens that did not exchange freely at par would create two problems, and CDP is in a position to solve both:
To settle with any counterparty, a clearing member would need to hold all three tokens. CDP could spare clearing members from holding all three by accepting each token at par. It would then settle the net amounts the banks owed one another, as it does today through settlement banks
Capital markets would settle in three units of cash, where today they settle in one. CDP could restore a single unit if the banks made their tokens redeemable into the CDP token, in which clearing members would then settle
MAS's BLOOM initiative7 is building frameworks to distribute and clear different settlement instruments across the financial system as a whole (Appendix A). CDP could solve the two problems above for capital markets.
Two problems with three tokens, and how CDP could solve them
1Without exchange at par, a clearing member would need DBS, OCBC and UOB tokens to settle with counterparties at each bank.
2CDP could accept each bank's token at par from clearing members.
3CDP would then settle the net amounts the banks owed one another, as it does today through settlement banks.
4If the banks made their tokens redeemable into the CDP token, clearing members could settle in that one unit.
07 · CDP Token: How It Works
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CDP could issue a token fully backed by short-dated government paper, so every clearing member would hold its claim on CDP
1A clearing member would pay SGD to CDP
2CDP would issue CDP tokens for the same amount and invest the cash in a segregated reserve of government paper
3Clearing members would settle securities in CDP tokens on the ledger
4A clearing member would redeem CDP tokens for SGD at par whenever it chose
These four steps are our proposal, and none of them exists today.
CDP would hold the reserve in short-dated SGD government paper, meaning SGS Treasury Bills and MAS Bills. The Government of Singapore issues Treasury Bills at six-month and one-year tenors, and MAS issues MAS Bills at four-, twelve- and 36-week tenors.8
Every clearing member would then hold its cash as a claim on CDP. CDP already becomes each clearing member's counterparty when it novates a trade, and with the CDP token it would also issue the cash that clearing members settle in.
MAS has already defined the regulatory perimeter within which the CDP token would fall.
MAS's stablecoin framework requires the reserve to be held in cash, cash equivalents or government debt with three months or less to maturity. The reserve must cover every token in issue, be marked to market and be kept in segregated accounts.9
Four- and twelve-week MAS Bills would therefore qualify on issue, and longer bills once three months or less remained to maturity.
On 1 September 2026, MAS said that well-regulated stablecoins can be a credible settlement asset in tokenised financial markets.10
08 · CDP Token: Launch and Yield
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SGX could launch the CDP token with the fewest outside decisions, and its reserve yield could help pay for the infrastructure to issue the token and settle trades in it
Wholesale CBDC waits on MAS to extend access, and tokenised deposits wait on three banks and a means of exchanging their tokens at par. CDP, by contrast, already has the clearing members, settlement banks and depository the CDP token would need. Its main addition would be a ledger on which to issue the CDP token and settle trades in it.
A clearing member holding the CDP token would hold a claim backed in full by government paper and redeemable at par. In credit terms, that claim is the same as holding the government paper itself. The CDP token would therefore add no new credit risk to the financial system.
CDP would keep the reserve yield and could apply it to the cost of building and running the infrastructure that would issue the CDP token and settle trades in it.
MAS's consultation of 1 September 2026 proposes that issuers of MAS-regulated stablecoins pay holders no interest. It also asks whether issuers should be barred from using the interest earned on customer money to materially finance their business.10
As arithmetic only, a reserve of SGD 1 billion earning 2 per cent would earn SGD 20 million a year.11
Reserve income from settlement balances would fall as settlement improved. A clearing member that manages its cash well would obtain tokens from CDP as late as it could and redeem them as early as it could. The faster settlement became, the smaller the balances left in the CDP token, and the smaller the yield on them. Tokens posted as margin at SGX-DC would stay in place for as long as clearing members kept positions open, and would give the reserve a steadier base.
Principle 9 of the international Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMI) asks market infrastructures to settle in central bank money where practical and available.12 CDP would therefore need to offer settlement in wholesale CBDC alongside the CDP token as MAS extends access. Our proposed design would allow it to offer both.
09 · Tokenised SGS
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Tokenised SGS would back the CDP token from launch, and clearing members could later post it as margin at SGX-DC
Use 1 · From launch
Held in reserve by CDP
CDP would hold short-dated government paper, including tokenised SGS, in the reserve behind the CDP token. It would keep the yield and could apply it to the cost of the infrastructure that would issue the CDP token and settle trades in it.
Yield to CDP as issuer
Use 2 · Later
Posted as margin at SGX-DC
Clearing members could later post tokenised SGS as margin, once SGX-DC accepted tokenised securities of the kind clearing houses in the US and Europe are adopting. SGX-DC would then charge for it as Eurex and CME charge for securities collateral.
Coupon to the clearing member, fee to SGX-DC
CDP's reserve would give tokenised SGS a large holder from the outset, because clearing members would hold CDP tokens both to settle trades and to meet margin. A tokenised asset launched without such a holder would have to wait for a secondary market to form around it.
SGS in tokenised form could come about in two ways:
MAS could issue MAS Bills or SGS directly on a ledger, as its planned tokenised MAS Bills trial would begin to do2
CDP could hold SGS in its own account in MEPS+-SGS, where all SGS are recorded today, and issue tokens against them. Issuers of tokenised US Treasury products generally hold the Treasuries with a custodian in the same way, and the Government's issuance of SGS would be unaffected
CDP could also start the reserve with SGS and MAS Bills in their existing form, held in MEPS+-SGS. The CDP token would then need to wait for neither route.
Section 03
The same instruments could settle securities at CDP, and the CDP token could also meet cash margin at SGX-DC
10 · Securities Settlement at CDP
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Securities at CDPDerivatives at SGX-DC
CDP could settle through the day in any of the three instruments, but only tokenised deposits would leave banks owing each other
After a trade between clearing members at different banks
Instrument
Clearing members' claim is on
Interbank debt in the day
Credit risk in the cash leg
Tokenised deposits
Their own banks
Yes, until the banks settle
The issuing banks
CDP token
CDP
None
The government paper in CDP's reserve
Wholesale CBDC
MAS
None
None
Whichever instrument is chosen, CDP's first step would be the same. It would net trades and settle them atomically in batches, beginning with today's two at 10:00 and 13:30 and adding more through the day as clearing members became ready.
With tokenised deposits, the buyer's bank would owe the seller's bank until the two banks settled. Banks carry the same intraday exposure today in Singapore's retail payment systems, PayNow and FAST.
With the CDP token or wholesale CBDC, both sides of a trade would hold claims on the same issuer, so no bank would owe another. Wholesale CBDC would also make settlement free of credit risk from end to end, and clearing members could use it as MAS extends access.
CDP could settle in any of the three instruments outside MEPS+ operating hours, because settlement would follow the operating hours of whichever instrument was chosen.
11 · Cash Margin at SGX-DC
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Securities at CDPDerivatives at SGX-DC
SGX-DC could accept the CDP token as cash margin, keeping SGX's income whole and letting clearing members move margin at any hour
How the CDP token would work as cash margin
1A clearing member would pay SGD to CDP and receive CDP tokens for the same amount. It could redeem them for SGD at par whenever it chose.
2Each clearing member would post its CDP tokens to SGX-DC as cash margin.
3CDP would hold the SGD in its reserve, in short-dated government paper ring-fenced from CDP's own assets.
4CDP would keep the reserve yield, in place of the interest SGX-DC earns on cash margin today, so the income would stay within the SGX group.
5SGX-DC could call or return margin in CDP tokens at any hour, including when MEPS+ is closed.
Under our proposal, a clearing member would obtain CDP tokens and post them to SGX-DC to meet cash margin in SGD, in place of the cash it posts today.
As we understand it, SGX-DC keeps the interest on the cash margin it holds. With the CDP token, CDP would earn the yield on the reserve behind the tokens posted. SGX's group income would therefore hold, and SGX-DC would need no new fee.
SGX earned about SGD 135 million of treasury income in FY2026, roughly 9 per cent of its net revenue.13 The share of it earned on SGD cash margin would stay within the group
A clearing member would earn no interest on the CDP token, just as it earns none on cash margin today. If the CDP token fell under MAS's stablecoin rules, the proposed ban on paying holders interest would explain why to clearing members.10 In return, each clearing member could top up and withdraw margin at any hour, including when MEPS+ is closed.
A clearing house prefers cash margin, because it can use cash at once in a default. Eurex raised its fee on securities collateral from 1 January 2026 to make cash more attractive to clearing members.14 CME plans to accept tokenised cash issued by BMO.15 The CDP token would give SGX-DC tokenised cash that it could hold and use at any hour.
SGX-DC's use of the CDP token as margin would have one limit and depend on three conditions:
Until tokenised USD and JPY could follow, the CDP token would cover SGD margin only. SGD is probably a minority of SGX-DC's cash margin, because most of the exposures it clears are in USD and JPY
SGX-DC would hold a token issued by its own affiliate, so the reserve would need to be segregated and legally ring-fenced from CDP
In a default, SGX-DC would need to redeem CDP tokens for cash the same day. CDP would therefore need same-day access to cash against the government paper in its reserve
MAS's final stablecoin rules, or any separate arrangement MAS defined for the CDP token, would need to let CDP keep the reserve yield. MAS's consultation asks whether issuers should be barred from using the interest earned on customer money to materially finance their business (slide 08)
Tokenised USD and JPY collateral, such as tokenised US Treasuries, could follow once the clearing houses SGX competes with accept it widely. It is a safe assumption that clearing members, who fund margin at several clearing houses from one pool of collateral, would move that collateral to where it costs least to hold.16 SGX-DC could then charge for tokenised securities, including tokenised SGS, as Eurex and CME charge for securities collateral today.
Section 04
MAS would take on no new risk and SGX would earn new income from a token no major market has yet tried
12 · The National Policy View
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National policySGX commercialPrecedents
A CDP token would add no new risk to the financial system, and MAS already has a framework for each instrument
A fully reserved CDP token would add no new credit risk. Central bank money remains the safest instrument, and commercial bank money the one in which clearing members settle each day. The CDP token would carry only the credit risk of the government paper behind it. Only prefunded clearing members could hold it, to settle trades and meet margin. The deposits it drew from banks would therefore be limited to clearing members' settlement and margin cash.
All three instruments must be worth exactly one Singapore dollar at all times. Each must hold that value through its design, and for the CDP token a full reserve and redemption at par on demand would do so.
MAS has already built a framework for each instrument. Wholesale CBDC runs on the Singapore Dollar Test Network, and tokenised deposits fall within BLOOM. The CDP token would fall under the stablecoin rules on which MAS is consulting until 16 October 2026.10 MAS could therefore regulate all three instruments within perimeters it has already opened.
13 · The Commercial View for SGX
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National policySGX commercialPrecedents
SGX could earn fees and yield from four sources, and it would run every layer of the tokenised market
Income SGX would earn with the CDP token
Source
Earned by
New or existing
With the CDP token
Reserve yield
CDP
New
Earned on tokens held for settlement. It would shrink as settlement became faster, down to a floor set by the prefunding SGX required
Settlement fees
CDP
Existing
Charged on securities settled in the CDP token
Margin income
SGX-DC today, then CDP
Existing
Interest on SGD cash margin would become reserve yield once clearing members posted CDP tokens
Depository fees
CDP
Existing
Earned on securities held in tokenised form
Beyond these four sources of income, SGX would operate all three layers of the tokenised market:
The money layer, as issuer of the CDP token
The collateral layer, as holder of the government paper in the reserve and of the CDP tokens posted as margin at SGX-DC
The settlement layer, as operator of tokenised settlement at CDP
14 · Precedents and Scrutiny
The ProblemThe InstrumentsThe Two MarketsThree PerspectivesSequencing
National policySGX commercialPrecedents
CDP could be the first major market infrastructure to issue its own settlement token, and it could answer every question a regulator would ask
SIX Digital Exchange (SDX) settles tokenised bonds in Swiss National Bank (SNB) wholesale CBDC, under a pilot that runs until at least June 2027.17 The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) settles in Federal Reserve money. No major market infrastructure yet issues a settlement token of its own.
CME Group has said it is looking at a coin of its own. The tokenised cash CME plans with BMO for the second half of 2026 would be a liability of BMO.15
If SGX went first, other markets could adopt the CDP token as a Singapore model, and for the same reason regulators and clearing members would examine it closely.
A regulator would ask what backs the CDP token, who may hold it and which rules govern it. Government paper would back it in full, and CDP would redeem it at par. Only prefunded clearing members could hold it, and it would fall within a regulatory perimeter MAS has already defined.
Each day, clearing members settle billions of dollars through CDP and post billions in margin at SGX-DC. The CDP token would therefore launch with its users in place, where a new settlement instrument launched without such activity would have to wait for them to arrive.
Section 05
SGX could start with the two steps it controls and settle four open questions with MAS
15 · What Could Be Done First
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SGX could take two of the four steps alone, and the other two depend on MAS and the banks
1
CDP would issue the CDP token to clearing members Within SGX's control
Full backing, prefunding and redemption at par would keep new credit risk out of the financial system. CDP already has the clearing members and settlement banks the CDP token would need. It would have to add a ledger on which to issue the token and settle trades in it.
2
SGX-DC would accept the CDP token as cash margin Within SGX's control
The interest SGX-DC earns today on SGD cash margin would become reserve yield at CDP, so SGX's income would hold without a new fee. SGX-DC could accept tokenised USD and JPY collateral later, once the clearing houses SGX competes with accept it widely.
3
Tokenised deposits Depends on the banks
DBS, OCBC and UOB would each decide whether to issue tokenised deposits for settlement at CDP. Their tokens would also need a means of exchanging at par, which BLOOM is building to its own timetable.
4
Wholesale CBDC Depends on MAS
MAS would need to extend access beyond the banks in its trial and move the Singapore Dollar Test Network into production. SGX can prepare to settle in wholesale CBDC, but only MAS can decide when to open it to more institutions and move it into production.
SGX could take steps 1 and 2 in turn without waiting for the banks or MAS, whose steps could follow on their own timetables.
16 · Questions to Settle Together
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SGX and MAS would need to answer four questions together before CDP could issue the CDP token
Access to the CDP token would need limits set jointly by SGX and MAS. They would decide which clearing members could hold the token, how much each would prefund and how many tokens could be in circulation at once. They would also decide when SGX-DC would begin accepting the token as margin.
Perimeter questions would fall to MAS. MAS would decide whether the CDP token comes under the stablecoin rules as written or under an arrangement MAS defines for market infrastructure. MAS would also need to be satisfied that the reserve was ring-fenced from CDP, so that SGX-DC could hold the token as margin.
Issuance of tokenised SGS could begin with MAS, issuing directly on a ledger, or with CDP, tokenising SGS held in its own account. MAS and CDP would need to agree which comes first, and when.
Yield from the reserve behind the CDP token, including the yield on tokens posted as margin, would need to be divided. SGX and MAS would agree how much went to infrastructure cost, to clearing member fees and to SGX's return.
17
As a thought exercise, we have set out one way to combine the instruments MAS has built or planned into a settlement layer for Singapore's capital markets. SGX would operate that settlement layer, and the yield on government paper would help pay for it.
Appendix A
MAS's BLOOM programme covers payments, and capital markets settlement would run alongside it
18 · Appendix A: BLOOM
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BLOOM is building the means for tokenised deposits to exchange at par, and its named use cases are all payments
MAS launched BLOOM (Borderless, Liquid, Open, Online, Multi-currency) on 16 October 2025.7 It succeeds Project Orchid, which had run more than ten trials of programmable and tokenised money since 2021.
BLOOM covers tokenised deposits and regulated stablecoins in G10 and Asian currencies, for wholesale settlement both at home and across borders. MAS has named three use cases: corporate treasury, trade finance and payments initiated by AI agents.
Participants include DBS, OCBC, UOB, J.P. Morgan, Standard Chartered, Circle, Stripe, Partior and Coinbase. Maybank Singapore joined on 6 August 2026, and Visa followed on 25 August 2026, naming Nium as its partner in a stablecoin settlement pilot.
BLOOM participants are building frameworks to distribute and clear different settlement instruments, and are writing common compliance standards for cross-border use.
BLOOM's work on exchanging tokenised deposits at par addresses the first problem on slide 06. Because its use cases are all payments, SGX and MAS would take up the capital markets questions on slides 06 to 16 alongside it.
1CDP risk management. CDP becomes the counterparty to both sides of a matched trade by novation, and delivers securities only once they are paid for. In each batch, money and securities settle simultaneously. CDP collects margin from clearing members on their outstanding trades and may call additional margin. It also keeps a Clearing Fund of contributions from CDP and clearing members, and clearing members make further contingent contributions if CDP calls them. Losses from a default fall first on the defaulter's margin. Sources: CDP, Disclosure Document under the PFMI, December 2023; CDP Settlement Rules, Regulatory Notice 3.4.1; Allen & Gledhill, SGX implements refinements to CDP margin and clearing fund frameworks, 2022.
2Wholesale CBDC. Wholesale central bank digital currency is digital money that a central bank issues to regulated financial institutions, and never to the public. MAS completed its first live trial issuance of SGD wholesale CBDC on the Singapore Dollar Test Network on 13 November 2025, with DBS, OCBC and UOB settling interbank overnight loans recorded in their official books. MAS said it would next trial tokenised MAS Bills issued to primary dealers and settled in wholesale CBDC, and that it would share details in 2026. Sources: MAS media release, 13 November 2025; speech by MAS Managing Director Chia Der Jiun, Singapore FinTech Festival, 13 November 2025.
3CDP settlement schedule. CDP runs an intraday batch from 10:00, completed by 12:30, and a final batch from 13:30. Clearing members meet final cash calls by 15:30, and the final batch completes by 16:00. Securities in the ready market settle T+2. Sources: CDP Settlement Rules, Regulatory Notice 3.4.1, as amended 25 January 2021; SGX-ST Rules, Chapter 9.
4SGS settlement. Institutional trades in SGS and MAS Bills settle T+1, delivery versus payment, in MEPS+. Source: MAS, Market Features: SGS, Money Market, Repo and Swaps Markets.
5SGX-DC margin. Where a clearing member's total margin exceeds USD 1 million, cash and government securities must make up at least USD 1 million or 60 per cent of it, whichever is greater. Eligible government securities include MAS Bills, SGS, and US, Japanese and German government securities. Sources: SGX-DC Clearing Rules 7.20.2; SGX-DC Circular DC/CCM 4 of 2019.
6DBS Token Services. DBS launched tokenised deposit services for its own institutional clients on 18 October 2024. Source: DBS media release, 18 October 2024.
7BLOOM. MAS launched BLOOM (Borderless, Liquid, Open, Online, Multi-currency) on 16 October 2025. Its predecessor, Project Orchid, began in 2021 and ran more than ten trials. Participants include Anchorage Digital, Ant International, Circle, Coinbase, DBS, J.P. Morgan, Kasikorn Bank, OCBC, Partior, Schroders, Standard Chartered, StraitsX, Stripe, Temasek, UOB and Xweave. Maybank Singapore joined on 6 August 2026. Visa joined on 25 August 2026 and named Nium as its first pilot partner. Sources: MAS media release, 16 October 2025; OpenGov Asia, October 2025; Maybank media release, 6 August 2026; Fintech News Singapore, August 2026; Crowdfund Insider, 25 August 2026.
8Government paper. SGS Treasury Bills are issued by the Government of Singapore at six-month and one-year tenors. MAS Bills are issued by MAS at four-, twelve- and 36-week tenors. Source: MAS, information for institutions on SGS Treasury Bills and MAS Bills.
9Stablecoin framework (2023). MAS requires a regulated stablecoin's reserve to be held in cash, cash equivalents or debt securities with three months or less to maturity, issued by the government or central bank of the reference currency, among other eligible issuers. The reserve must equal at least 100 per cent of tokens in issue, be marked to market daily, sit in segregated accounts and be independently attested each month. Source: MAS media release, 15 August 2023.
10Stablecoin legislation (2026). MAS's consultation on amendments to the Payment Services Act 2019 proposes that issuers of MAS-regulated stablecoins pay holders no interest, return or other benefit for holding the token. The same paper asks whether issuers should be barred from using customer money, and the interest earned on it, to materially finance their business. MAS Deputy Managing Director Ho Hern Shin said well-regulated stablecoins can be a credible settlement asset in tokenised financial markets. The consultation closes on 16 October 2026. Sources: MAS Consultation Paper P015-2026 and media release, 1 September 2026.
11Reserve yield. The 2 per cent rate is an assumption for the arithmetic. The cut-off yield on six-month SGS Treasury Bills ranged from 1.36 per cent at the auction of 12 February 2026 to 1.92 per cent at the auction of 24 September 2026. A reserve held in paper of three months or less would earn the rate on that shorter paper. Source: MAS SGS auction results, 2026.
12PFMI. Principle 9 of the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures provides that an infrastructure should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. Source: Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures and International Organization of Securities Commissions (CPMI-IOSCO), Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures, April 2012.
13SGX treasury income. SGX reported FY2026 net revenue of SGD 1,478 million and net revenue excluding treasury income of SGD 1,343.1 million, which implies treasury income of about SGD 135 million. Treasury income fell SGD 9.6 million in the half year to 31 December 2025. Sources: SGX financial results for the half year to 31 December 2025 and for the year to 30 June 2026.
14Eurex Clearing collateral pricing. From 1 January 2026, Eurex Clearing raised its standard service fee on securities collateral from 0.10 to 0.175 per cent a year, and improved the return on cash by about 5 basis points, to make cash more attractive as margin. Source: Eurex Clearing circular, Collateral Pricing Redesign 2026.
15CME Group. CME's chief executive said on 4 February 2026 that CME is looking at a coin of its own that other market participants could use. Separately, BMO plans to issue tokenised cash on CME's permissioned ledger in the second half of 2026, subject to regulatory approval. Sources: CME Group earnings call, 4 February 2026; CME Group and BMO media release, 24 March 2026.
16CFTC tokenised collateral guidance. On 8 December 2025, CFTC staff confirmed that tokenised versions of assets already eligible as margin, including US Treasury securities and money market fund shares, may be used as collateral for futures and cleared swaps. The CFTC launched a pilot for digital asset collateral on the same day. Sources: CFTC Staff Letter 25-39; CFTC press release 9146-25, 8 December 2025.
17SDX and the Helvetia pilot. The SNB has issued wholesale CBDC on SIX's digital asset platform since December 2023 to settle tokenised bonds. It extended the Helvetia pilot in June 2025, and SIX states that the pilot runs until at least June 2027. The SNB has made no commitment to permanent issuance. Sources: SNB, Questions and answers on Project Helvetia; SIX Digital Exchange, Helvetia Pilot.
